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In Pursuit of  Peace: Zhou Gengsheng’s 
Internationalism after the World Wars
Hiroki Morikawa
Abstract: This paper investigates the internationalism of  Zhou Gengsheng, an expert in interna-
tional law in twentieth century China.  The Fourteen Points, stated by US President Woodrow Wilson, 
advocated the abolition of  secret diplomacy, reduction of  armaments, partial approval of  the self- 
determination of  nationalities, and the establishment of  the League of  Nations, initially received unani-
mous praise in China.  However, the praise and expectations of  Chinese intellectuals deflated rapidly, as 
China had difficulty in recovering the Shandong concession from Germany due to the resolute opposi-
tion of  Japan at the Paris Peace Conference.  It is well known that the significant disappointment caused 
by the conference led to the May Fourth Movement, which followed soon after.  Even so, the expecta-
tions and support for international cooperation were strong, even after the conference.  Some intellectu-
als thought that China and the rest of  the world should proceed to establish a new international order 
based on international cooperation.  Zhou Gengsheng was one of  those vocal proponents.  He was 
hopeful that the League of  Nations would play a main role in the process of  establishing this order. 
Although he also admitted the potential defects of  the League, such as giving priority to the inter-
ests of  the most powerful members, he firmly believed that internationalism was one of  the inevitable 
trajectories of  history, and he still asserted that the League was essential for achieving international 
cooperation, even after the Mukden Incident.  After World War II, Zhou still believed in internationalism 
and held ardent hope for the United Nations fulfilling such international cooperation.
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The world experienced two world wars in the twentieth century, both of  which resulted 
in unprecedented damage.  As a result of  these wars, the human race was largely convinced 
to pursue peace, and to construct mechanisms that could ensure the manifestation of  peace. 
This hope and subsequent efforts toward peace also appeared in China.  Some researchers 
have paid attention to this theme and shed light on the activities of  Chinese diplomats, as well 
as the influence that the League of  Nations exerted on the Republic of  China in particular.1 
However, research on the trend of  international cooperation which aroused the hope and 
effort of  the Chinese people has been limited.  Japanese and English studies have tended to 
solely point out the disappointment at the actual circumstances of  international cooperation 
after World War I.  These studies have underestimated the positive impact that the trend of  
international cooperation has had on China.2  Studies in Chinese have displayed the same 
tendency.  Although the quality of  China’s research into modern history has remarkably 
improved in recent decades, it is difficult to determine whether or not the study of  this theme 
will become popular in mainland China.3  Still, the significance of  understanding how the 
people of  China have desired and achieved peace, and how the trend of  international coop-
eration sustained China cannot be overstated.  There are a number of  Chinese intellectuals 
who have written on this subject, and consequently it is difficult to comprehensively study 
the entire gamut of  their work.  Therefore, this paper focuses specifically on the work of  
Zhou Gengsheng.
Zhou Gengsheng was born in Changsha, Hunan province in 1889.  His original name 
was Zhou Lan.4  Although he came from a poor family, he was offered a government schol-
arship due to his excellent academic record at school, and began to study in Japan in 1905. 
 1 For the activities of  the League in China, see Chang Li, Guoji hezuo zai Zhongguo: Guoji Lianmeng 
jiaose de kaocha, 1919–1946.  For the relationship between the League and the Beiyang govern-
ment, see Tang Qihua, Beijing zhengfu yu Guoji Lianmeng, 1919–1928.
 2 Some works focused on the positive impacts, examined its contents and offer valuable informa-
tion for further research.  See, Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the 
International Origins of  Anticolonial Nationalism; Yoshizawa Seiichiro, “Kori to kyoken: minkoku 
hachinen no kokusai kankei ron”; Alison Adcock Kaufman, “In Pursuit of  Equality and Respect: 
China’s Diplomacy and the League of  Nations.”  Unfortunately, none of  them referred to the texts 
of  Zhou Gengsheng.  Consequently, there remains some issues in using the materials.
 3 Some exceptional works shed light on the positive impact of  the trend of  international coopera-
tion.  For example, Luo Zhitian used various materials which were not referenced by Japanese and 
English studies.  These materials gave a detailed examination of  arguments supporting interna-
tional cooperation.  See, Luo Zhitian, “Lixiang yu xianshi: qingji minchu shijie zhuyi yu minzu 
zhuyi de guanlian hudong.”
 4 For Zhou Gengsheng’s career, see Zhou Rusong “Zhou Gengsheng xiansheng zhuanlüe.”
IN PURSUIT OF PEACE: ZHOU GENGSHENG’S INTERNATIONALISM AFTER THE WORLD WARS
179
He enrolled in Waseda University and studied political science, law, and economics.  At the 
same time, he joined the Tongmenghui, a revolutionary association led by Sun Yat-sen.  After 
returning to China, he continuously engaged in revolutionary activities to overthrow the 
Qing Dynasty.  In the Republic of  China, he strongly opposed the authoritarian political 
leadership that Yuan Shikai promoted, and started propaganda to overthrow it.  Because 
of  this, he could not stay in China and fled to the United Kingdom to study in 1913 as an 
exile, changing his name to Zhou Gengsheng.  In Scotland, he enrolled at the University of  
Edinburgh where he majored in political science, law, and economics and obtained a master’s 
degree.  Subsequently, Zhou Gengsheng moved to the University of  Paris and received a 
PhD.  He returned to China in 1921, where he began his academic life as a professor at Peking 
University.  At the end of  the 1920s, he moved to Wuhan University where he was appointed 
chancellor in 1945.  After 1949, he chose to remain in the People’s Republic of  China, teaching 
and studying at Wuhan University and occasionally offering advice on foreign policy to Zhou 
Enlai as a Foreign Ministry adviser.
During the Cultural Revolution, many intellectuals received a great deal of  criticism. 
While Zhou Gengsheng could not escape this critique, the degree to which this was experi-
enced did not seem as serious.  In his long academic life, he published many books, includ-
ing: Lingshi caipan quan (Consular Jurisdiction) (1923), Jindai ouzhou waijiaoshi (Diplomatic 
History in Modern Europe) (1927), Zuijin guoji zhengzhi xiaoshi (A Short History of  
International Politics) (1929), Guoji zhengzhi gailun (An Introduction to International Politics) 
(1930), Xiandai guojifa wenti (International Legal Problems in the Modern World) (1931), 
Guojifa dagang (A Principle of  International Law) (1934), Guojifa (International Law) (1975), 
etc.  As these titles show, he was an expert in international law and politics.  In the People’s 
Republic of  China, he was sometimes praised as “a father of  international law.”5  Zhou 
Gengsheng died of  illness in Beijing in 1971.
Zhou Gengsheng is a suitable focus for this study given that he is a twentieth century 
Chinese scholar of  international law and politics.  After the end of  both World War I and 
World War II, he published many articles on the construction of  peace, yet very little research 
has been done on his writings.  In those writings, as “a father of  international law,” he vig-
orously supported the trend of  international cooperation.  The impact of  the trend has often 
been overlooked in previous studies, mainly due to the malfunction of  the League of  Nations 
as mentioned below.  However, many intellectuals at that time were conscious of  this impact 
and reflected on how to achieve peace.  After the 1920s, Zhou Gengsheng had consistently 
been at the centre of  the development of  international law in Republican China, and ener-
getically advocated for international cooperation to achieve peace.  Academic enquiry on 
Zhou Gengsheng is necessary to understand how the trend of  international cooperation was 
 5 Liu Zhongmeng, “Guojifa zhi fu Zhou Gengsheng xiansheng zhuanlüe.”
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exerted on China.  This paper will identify some characteristics of  what and how those intel-
lectuals thought by focusing on Zhou’s writings.
1. Tone of Arguments after World War I
The Republic of  China declared neutrality after World War I broke out in July 1914. 
Changes in the international situation did not however allow China to maintain this neutrality. 
Elite leaders argued over whether or not the country should participate in the war.  The Prime 
Minister of  the Beijing government, Duan Qirui, presented an argument for China to support 
Germany and stand on the side of  the Entente countries.  The President, Li Yuanhong, and 
most governor-generals of  the provinces were opposed to this idea.  Public opinion in China 
was split, but Duan Qirui finally severed diplomatic relations with Germany in March 1917, 
and declared war against Germany and Austria in August.6  Consequently, China became one 
of  the victorious countries, furthering the movement to seek the recovery of  Shandong which 
Japan had acquired from Germany during the war.
A speech presented by US President Woodrow Wilson in Congress in January 1918 
greatly enhanced the movement in support of  recovering Shandong.  This speech, stating 
the abolition of  secret diplomacy, reduction of  armaments, partial approval of  the self-deter-
mination of  nationalities, and the establishment of  international peace organizations, came 
to be known as the Fourteen Points.  The Fourteen Points initially received unanimous praise 
in China.
For example, Chen Duxiu, the Dean of  Humanities at Peking University and an editor 
of  one of  the representative magazines in China—The New Youth (Xin Qingnian), published 
another magazine—The Weekly Critic (Meizhou pinglun), just after the victory in the war. 
The magazine called Wilson’s speech “fair” and praised Wilson as “the best man in the cur-
rent world” in the magazine’s first edition.  Chen Duxiu rearranged Wilson’s claims into two 
principles, stating “each country is not allowed to violate the equality and freedom of  other 
countries”, and “each country’s government is not allowed to violate the equality and freedom 
of  its people with an iron fist”.  Chen Duxiu voiced his approval of  both of  these principles. 
In the same article, he also stressed that during World War I, gongli (the universal justice) 
linked with these two principles defeated the qiangquan (the naked power).  He expressed 
that The Weekly Critic would aim at “asserting the gongli and opposing the naked power.”7 
His belief  that the relationship between countries was to be based upon gongli, rather than 
authoritarian power and invasion showed his expectations for international cooperation.
 6 For the Republic of  China entry into the World War I, see Onodera Shiro, “Chugoku nashonari-
zumu to daiichiji sekai taisen,” pp. 187–192.
 7 Zhiyan (Chen Duxiu), “Meizhou pinglun fakanci,” p. 1.
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However, expectations deflated rapidly.  At the Paris Peace Conference beginning in 
January 1919, China was expected to naturally recover Shandong.  However, due to the reso-
lute opposition of  Japan, China experienced difficulty in this regard.  Japan’s opposition was 
further supported by Britain and France.  This situation was unacceptable to Chen Duxiu 
who lamented, “At the Paris Peace Conference, each country merely respected their own 
rights.  Gongli, permanent peace, and the Fourteen Points became completely worthless.” 
Chen severely criticized Wilson, whom he had previously praised as “the best man in the 
current world.”8  He said that since the Fourteen Points, which describe Wilson’s plan for 
peace, represent an ideal that can never be fully realized, Wilson is nothing more than a “big 
boaster.”9  This type of  sentiment prevailed across China, particularly among students in 
urban areas.  It is well known that this negative response led to the May Fourth Movement, 
which occurred soon after.
Amid the swirling disappointment and anger, Chen Duxiu, who had begun with such 
great expectations for gongli in the beginning, indicated his great suspicions.  He wrote: “If  
each individual and nation cannot have enough power for self-defence and simply hope that 
gongli will become accepted far and wide, relying on the mercy and help of  others to survive, 
they will be reduced to slaves with no bravery, no honour, and no self-supporting ability.”  He 
argued that instead, “the advocacy of  a strong force is needed since gongli alone cannot exert 
enough pressure on its own.”10  Gongli must be supported by force.  Eventually, Chen Duxiu 
took an interest in the rising Soviet Russia and proceeded to found the Chinese Communist 
Party.  The betrayal of  his expectations toward gongli was one of  the main elements con-
tributing to and encouraging his efforts to found the party.  This betrayal caused Chen Dixiu 
great disappointment.
It is quite easy to find writings, such as those by Chen Duxiu, that are skeptical or crit-
ical of  international cooperation.  It is also a certain fact that this discourse was powerful. 
However, it is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that mere skepticism and negative 
attitudes toward international cooperation were not the predominant opinions.  Expectations 
and support for international cooperation were still strong, even after the Paris Peace 
Conference.  Some intellectuals thought that China and the rest of  the world should proceed 
to establish a new international order based on international cooperation.  Zhou Gengsheng 
was one of  these supporters.
Zhou Gengsheng mainly published his articles in the The Pacific Ocean (Taipingyang) 
magazine at that time.11  The Pacific Ocean was founded in Shanghai in March 1917.  After 
the fifth edition of  Volume 4, the journal was moved to Beijing.  In June 1925, the magazine 
 8 Zhiyan, “Suiganlu Liangge hehui dou wuyong,” p. 3.
 9 Zhiyan, “Suiganlu Wei dapao,” p. 3.
 10 Zhiyan, “Shandong wenti yu guomin juewu: duiwai duinei liangzhong chedi de juewu,” p. 1.
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stopped publishing.  Li Jiannong (at the time of  its founding), Yang Duanliu (since Vol. 2 
No. 7), and Zhou Gengsheng, and his colleagues at Peking University (since Vol. 4) were the 
centre of  the editing team.  Just like Zhou Gengsheng, Li Jiannong and Yang Duanliu were 
also born in Hunan province and were familiar with each other from their days as student. 
They also had a lot in common throughout their careers.  Li Jiannong and Yang Duanliu like 
Zhou Gengsheng had all studied in Japan at the end of  the Qing Dynasty.  Upon return to 
China, they also engaged in the anti-Yuan Shikai speech campaign and as a result, they were 
forced to leave China for the United Kingdom.  Li Jiannong went back to China in 1916 and 
began to manage The Pacific Ocean.  Yang Duanliu and Zhou Gengsheng were still living 
abroad at that time, but also made contributions to the magazine.  Both Yang Duanliu and 
Zhou Gengsheng began to more actively participate in managing the magazine after return-
ing to China.
The authors of  The Pacific Ocean all recognized that a significant change had been 
occurring in the world, even though they maintained some differences in opinion.  Tao 
Menghe, who would soon have an esteemed position as a sociologist at Peking University 
offered a clever explanation for this change.  According to him, the world had rushed from an 
era in which each country was individually self-sufficient into an era where the relationship 
between countries had become much closer than in the past.  This closeness was evidenced 
by the appearance of  improved modes of  transport and communication such as trains, 
steamers, international post, and telegraphs.  Since the emergence of  this shift, the world 
began to face the following problems: “If  a plague occurred in one place, it would prevail in 
and endanger other areas easily.  If  a boycott against the goods from a foreign country broke 
out in one place, it would influence commerce and industry in different regions and cause a 
disturbance in the economies of  these regions.  If  a few countries waged war amongst them-
selves, the entire world would fall into disorder and each country would become unstable.” 
The balance of  power theory had existed as a framework governing the way of  the world. 
Yet, this theory could no longer be relied upon.  Certainly, holding “the balance” between 
nations was a military matter which was useful in order to preserve the interests of  each 
country.  However, “if  each country regarded the military as a power guaranteeing peace, an 
excessive arms race would occur.”12  The excessive arms race naturally brought about World 
War I.  Therefore, the world after the war could not be permitted to be regulated by the same 
 11 For basic information on The Pacific Ocean, see Chen Youliang, “Liuying xuesheng yu wusi xin-
wenhua yundong: yi taipingyang zazhi wei zhongxin”; Morikawa Hiroki, “Taiheiyou zasshi to 
wahei no tsuikyu: goshi zengo ni okeru kokunai chitsujyo ron to kokusai chitsujyo ron.”  For its 
view of  international cooperation, see Chen Youliang, “Wusi zhishi fenzi de guoji zhuyi guan: 
Taipingyang yu weierxun zhuyi”; Zheng Dahua and Wang Min, “Ouzhan hou zhongguo zhishijie 
dui jianli guoji lianmeng de sikao: yi taipingyang zazhi wei zhongxin de kaocha.”
 12 Tao Lügong (Tao Menghe), “Wanguo lianmeng jiqi cunzai zhi liyou”, pp. 1–6.
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balance of  power theory that had preceded the conflict.
What theory should people rely on to manage the world following such a devastating 
global conflict?  Zhou Gengsheng unequivocally explained this point.  He called attention 
to the fact that an “idea of  social and mutual aid (Qunxing gongji zhi sixiang)” had spread 
gradually in Europe since the late nineteenth century.  This belief  in social and mutual aid 
for humanity “acknowledged the significance of  social and mutual aid between the strong 
and the weak.  It did not allow for the survival of  the fittest and neither did it yield to natural 
selection.  Rather it granted each individual the opportunity for survival.”
Building cooperation and eliminating struggle were therefore the key features of  this 
philosophy.  The philosophy was regarded as internationalism (guoji zhuyi) and applied as a 
framework to regulate international relations.  The influence of  internationalism was much 
stronger following the rise of  Wilson.  In the Fourteen Points, President Wilson advocated 
for the self-determination of  peoples and the formation of  the League of  Nations as a means 
of  achieving internationalism.13  Zhou Gengsheng claimed that given the times, the League 
of  Nations which would embody internationalism, should be responsible for governing the 
world.
A noteworthy fact is that Zhou Gengsheng did not praise the League of  Nations.  He 
actually complained unreservedly: “Many people see the League of  Nations with their own 
eyes and feel greatly disappointed.  I am one of  them as well.”14  Furthermore, in a meeting 
held in Paris, he strongly demanded the full return of  the Shandong concession and the full 
elimination of  the Twenty-One Demands,15 clearly displaying resentment against the peace 
treaty, in a similar way to Chen Duxiu.
That being said, Zhou Gengsheng also asserted that his “confidence in the principle 
of  the League remains undiminished even now.”16  The League certainly had serious prob-
lems.  Among these challenges were the enactment of  specific plans and the establishment 
of  organizations that were unable to meet the hopes of  the people around the world.  There 
was the desire for a much more effective international organization to replace the League in 
the future.  At the same time, Zhou Gengsheng paid attention to one fact: “As Rome was not 
built in a day, the realization of  such a complete international organization is not as easy as it 
sounds.”17  He clearly understood the difficulty in founding a perfect international organiza-
tion.  Therefore, he would continue to advcocate for the League, which was “a fait accompli” 
and “playing more or less important functions in world politics.”18  The reason why Zhou 
 13 Gengsheng, “Wanguo tongmeng zhi sanda yiyi,” pp. 5–6.
 14 Zhou Gengsheng, Wanguo lianmeng, p. 1.
 15 “Bali zailiu huaren kaihui ji.”
 16 Zhou Gengsheng, Wanguo lianmeng, p. 5.
 17 Ibid., p. 5.
 18 Ibid., p. 1.
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Gengsheng strongly supported the League, even though he expressed some reservations, was 
connected with his study.  For instance, one of  his books International Legal Problems in the 
Modern World referred to works of  Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, Frederick Pollock, 
James Wilford Garner and James Brown Scott.  Those scholars were in favor of  and promoted 
international cooperation and the authority of  the League.19  It was completely natural that 
Zhou Gengsheng, who was fond of  reading their works, upheld the League.
It is hard to answer whether or not the League could have subsequently undergone 
steady development.  At that time in China, expectations for the League became lower 
and lower, never rising again.  For example, the Republic of  China had lost the seat of  the 
non-permanent members of  the Council from 1923 to 1925 due to defeats in the elections of  
the Assembly.  With the League giving priority to the interests of  the same powers since its 
establishment, the loss of  seats led not only to harsh opinions and insistence upon the with-
drawal from the League, but also led to severe calls for the abolition of  the League itself.20 
However, such severe criticism was not solely the primary tone regarding the League.  Some 
intellectuals complained that negative evaluation of  the League was an error and asserted 
that the existence of  it was essential for achieving international cooperation.  In The Pacific 
Ocean, important and influential articles supporting internationalism consistently appeared. 
Among these articles were publications from Zhou Gengsheng aimed at highlighting the 
necessity of  the League.
2. Internationalism after the Mukden Incident
The outbreak of  the Mukden Incident in September 1931 almost destroyed the existing 
support for internationalism, and critically marred the prestige of  the League of  Nations. 
The series of  events, including the mediation by the League after the incident broke out and 
Japan’s withdrawal from the League (both of  which caused the secession of  Manchuria), did 
not bring about satisfaction to the Chinese people.  In addition, the 1934–1935 invasion and 
annexation of  Ethiopia by Italy occupied a great deal of  attention from the Chinese people, 
and it was noted that the League had no power to obstruct Italy from its actions.  In essen-
tially bypassing the regulations of  the League, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
promoted the appeasement policy to achieve peace with the sacrifice of  Czechoslovakia in the 
mid-1930s.  These occurrences were enough to erode the authority of  the League.
As distrust of  the League spread wider, some intellectuals began to denounce the help-
lessness of  diplomacy that was centred on expectations and confidence in the League by 
 19 For those scholars, see Shinohara Hatsue, US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A 
Forgotten Crusade, pp. 12–63.
 20 Wang Kaiji, “Guoji lianmeng gai si.”
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referring to the concept as idealism diplomacy.  This form of  diplomacy was seen to be pow-
erless.  Increased attention was paid to the form of  diplomacy being practiced by Germany, 
Italy, and Japan, which was termed as realism diplomacy.  This emerging form of  diplomacy 
resulted in a decline in the League’s authority, and intellectuals asserted that China should 
also promote such diplomacy.  Under these mounting pressures, the appeasement policy of  
Chamberlain was evaluated as ingenious diplomacy that prevented Britain from entering into 
conflict with Germany and Italy.  This assisted in avoiding a large war again, and the League 
was regarded as useless and obsolete.
Such evaluation however, was not applicable in the view of  Zhou Gengsheng.  In his 
view, realism diplomacy was nothing more than speculative diplomacy.  Under the circum-
stances, international interests would always vary.  Realism diplomacy solely emphasized 
the individual country’s interests, abandoned treaty obligations, downplayed laws and jus-
tice, and would “never hesitate to make the attitude of  today’s challenge the attitude of  the 
day before.”  It was only the powers with force that could practice realism diplomacy based 
on the “speculative” principle.  If  a weak country that was lacking in force, such as China, 
attempted to practice realism diplomacy, it could be harmful to the country.21
Rejecting realism diplomacy, Zhou Gengsheng longed for idealism diplomacy: “the trust 
in the League of  Nations, the deference to the treaty, and the support to collective security.”22 
Zhou Gengsheng also clearly understood that expectations for the League were being greatly 
reduced, as the authority of  the League continued to be damaged.  Nevertheless, he was never 
shaken in his support for idealism diplomacy.
Zhou Gengsheng’s perspective was sustained by his belief  in “civilized human society,” 
and that ideas such as the basic principles of  right or wrong and common justice were more 
influential than any other principle.  From this point of  view, he concluded that “national 
policies and actions violating the zeitgeist of  this kind will ultimately face indefensible resist-
ance in the world.”23  It appeared that powerful and aggressive nations were able to downplay 
the League of  Nations without considering the pursuance of  collective security.  However, 
according to Zhou Gengsheng, the “strongest nations in history,” such as Napoleon’s France 
and Wilhelm II’s Germany, eventually collapsed as both of  them had neglected the “zeitgeist 
of  international society.”  Therefore, the approach of  powerful and aggressive nations was 
not as firm as believed by some, and would be even less applicable for a weak and encroached-
upon nation like China.  If  such a nation disregarded the collective security or the League and 
relied on realism diplomacy, it would be choosing “suicide diplomacy.”24
 21 Zhou Gengsheng, “Xianshi zhuyi waijiao chaoliu xia de zhongguo waijiao fanglüe.”
 22 Zhou Gengsheng, “Lixiang waijiao yu xianshi waijiao,” p. 3.
 23 Zhou Gengsheng, “Waijiao shang jizhong cuowu de kanfa,” pp. 2–3.
 24 Ibid., p. 3.
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If  China promoted realism diplomacy, what kind of  situation would occur?  If, under 
realism diplomacy, the Republic of  China tolerated the behaviour of  Germany and Italy as 
the United Kingdom did, China would inevitably lose international sympathy and damage 
its self-position.  Additionally, China would not necessarily obtain any new interests or assis-
tance from Germany and Italy.  While it was certain that China would lose other interests, it 
had little possibility of  obtaining new benefits.
As realism diplomacy would result in the problems outlined above, one option that 
China could choose was “collective security based on the zeitgeist,” which was being advo-
cated through “idealism,” i.e. constructing peace through the League of  Nations.  For Zhou 
Gengsheng, it was collective security that was “after all, the ideal system of  world politics.” 
He believed that the “ideal system was not only important in the establishment of  world 
peace, but was also one of  the most powerful security systems for the safety of  China.”25 
It can be said that Zhou Gengsheng’s views in this regard reflected the internationalism he 
proposed after World War I.
It is easy to dismiss the internationalism and the idealism diplomacy that Zhou 
Gengsheng advocated as being too ideal.  Also, the realism he was censuring was assumed 
that power, in addition to ideals, was to be considered in international politics.  It was not 
simply about supporting Germany and Italy, as Zhou Gengsheng asserted.  Zhou Gengsheng 
consequently advanced his argument forcibly to strengthen his claims.  This was prompted 
by his fervent belief  that the concept dismissed as idealism was much more realistic for weak 
countries such as China.  He posited that it would be quite dangerous to abandon the League 
of  Nations or the ideal it embodied in the name of  realism.  Zhou Gengsheng’s position was 
also underpinned by his analysis of  the international situation.
Zhou Gengsheng’s position can be further understood through an evaluation of  the real-
ism diplomacy of  Chamberlain.  A representative aspect of  Chamberlain’s realism diplo-
macy is the appeasement policy.  Zhou Gengsheng directed Chinese readers to pay attention 
to whether or not the appeasement policy would reach its predetermined purpose.  Zhou 
Gengsheng believed that US President Franklin Roosevelt showed a clear attitude of  anti- 
aggression and anti-dictatorship, defending treaties and democracy, and trying to cooperate 
with the democratic nations to rebel against the violent rule of  the world.  Roosevelt’s policy 
was affecting the diplomacy of  the United Kingdom and France.  Based on this perspective, 
Zhou Gengsheng explained his outlook on international relations.  The United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States would form the democracy groups.  They would join forces 
with the Soviet Union, all of  whom would support the League of  Nations.  It would be pos-
sible and feasible for them to support collective security and resist the aggressor countries, 
with China also upholding this policy.  Zhou Gengsheng surmised that the realism diplomacy 
 25 Ibid., p. 2.
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of  Chamberlain would result in failure, and the idealism diplomacy that was sustained by 
gongli would supersede it.  The opinions of  Zhou Gengsheng were not isolated in Republican 
China.  In fact, quite a few intellectuals advocated the same opinions.  Hu Shi was a represen-
tative figure among them.  In The Independent Critique (Duli pinglun), he appealed to public 
opinion that using force against Japan was a terrible mistake, and prohibiting Japan from 
invading China through the mediation of  the League was the only reasonable course.26
3. Internationalism after World War II
Zhou Gengsheng expressed confidence in internationalism after World War II, just as he 
had done after World War I.  After the end of  the World War II, there were various perspec-
tives on and responses to the international situation in China.  Briefly summarized, it can be 
said that three schools of  thought appeared at the time.  The first, mainly was mainly prop-
agated by the Kuomintang, and involved strengthening cooperation with the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  Some intellectuals that kept their distance from KMT China also 
espoused this line because of  a strong sense of  caution towards the Soviet Union.  The Soviet 
Union in the secret agreement signed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, had been 
approved to ensure the rights and interests in Manchuria in exchange for waging war against 
Japan.  This fact became known to the Chinese people soon after the end of  the war and they 
were strongly opposed to it.
The second school of  thought was advocated by the Chinese Communist Party and the 
intellectuals close to the Party.  These persons cautioned against cooperation with the US 
and emphasised friendly relations with the Soviet Union.  The third school of  thought placed 
importance on cooperation with the two major powers, the US and the Soviet Union.  The 
line was pursued by some members of  the China Democratic League, who relentlessly criti-
cized Kuomintang and showed favor towards the Chinese Communist Party.  A representa-
tive figure among them, Zhang Dongsun, who once served the grand secretary of  the China 
Democratic League, asserted China should be the “bridge” between the US and the Soviet 
Union, to ease international tensions and promote international cooperation.27
Zhou Gengsheng chose the third line, even though he was not a member of  the China 
Democratic League.  He considered that to attain peace, China needed to establish a coop-
erative relationship with the US and the Soviet Union, rather than relying on either country 
alone.  He hoped that the newly founded United Nations would achieve collective security.  It 
 26 He wrote many articles on this theme.  As an article highly representing his support towards the 
League, see Hu Shi, “Guolian hai keyi taitou.”
 27 For Zhang’s this idea, see Morikawa Hiroki, Seironka no kyoji: chukaminkoku jiki ni okeru shosh-
isho to chotoson no seiji shiso, pp. 199–200.
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is evident that he was still committed to internationalism after World War II.  Yet, given the 
failure of  the League of  Nations in the recent past, he also imposed a new condition on the 
United Nations—the establishment of  a cooperative relationship between the US and the 
Soviet Union.  In his perspective, unless the two powers united their efforts to uphold the 
United Nations, the achievement of  peace in international society would never succeed.28
However, the situation that emerged after World War II was obviously different from 
that of  World War I in certain respects.  One of  the most remarkable points was the prac-
tical use of  nuclear power and weapons.  The world was asked to seriously consider this 
weapon.  Zhou Gengsheng was quick to react on this point.  In his view, this new situation 
had changed diplomacy entirely.  For example, if  nuclear weapons had emerged much earlier, 
the US would never have encouraged cooperation with the Soviet Union in waging war on 
Japan.  Additionally, the US would have never transferred interests that should have origi-
nally belonged to China to the Soviet Union in the secret agreement at the Yalta Conference. 
Nuclear weapons might cause similar changes in the future.
With nuclear power having the potential to alter diplomatic processes, Zhou Gengsheng 
presented a countermeasure that was still based on internationalism.  He was particularly 
hopeful that the activities of  the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission which was 
founded by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution in January 1946 would be effec-
tive.  This commission was created for the safe and peaceful use of  nuclear power and the 
eradication of  nuclear weapons.
In December 1946, the US presented the Baruch Plan to the commission.  The plan 
suggested the establishment of  an international inspection system for the management of  
nuclear power and nuclear weapons.  For such an establishment, stated members of  the 
United Nations Member States would be required to ratify the related treaty.  The specific 
contents of  the treaty were that an international organization for the management of  nuclear 
power was to be founded in the United Nations; its activities were not allowed to be affected 
by the veto of  the permanent members of  the Security Council; representatives of  this organ-
ization were entitled to freely inspect the territory of  ratified countries; and that the manufac-
ture of  nuclear weapons was to be strictly prohibited.
However, the Soviet Union abstained from voting on the Baruch Plan.  The plan never 
provided any results itself.  Yet, Zhou Gengsheng argued that the principle underlying the 
plan, and the development of  an international organization tasked with the management 
of  nuclear power were quite reasonable and indispensable.  He also claimed that “from the 
standpoint of  world peace, we do hope that the United States and the Soviet Union find some 
form of  agreement, the United Nations adopt proposals described in the plan, and the U.N. 
members carry them out faithfully.”  He also asserted that by modifying the Baruch Plan to 
 28 Zhou Gengsheng, “Jiti anquan xu,” pp. 1–3.
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take the Soviet Union’s position into consideration more favorably than before and to achieve 
agreement between the two superpowers, the proposals outlined above became more effec-
tive29.
It is easy to criticize Zhou Gengsheng’s thinking as too idealistic.  Indeed, it seems that 
he himself  was well aware that it was too idealistic, yet the position he took when he dis-
cussed international politics can still be considered as being realistic.  Zhou had predicted 
that Chamberlain’s appeasement policy would reach a deadlock before the policy actually 
failed to maintain international peace.  The quick consideration of  the degree to which 
nuclear weapons would affect international politics can also be considered as evidence of  
the realistic nature of  Zhou Gengsheng’s views.  Additionally, he warned of  the need for the 
US to earnestly commit to the reconstruction of  Japan and Germany, both of  whom were 
defeated in World War II, in order to disconnect the two countries from the Soviet Union and 
build a bulwark for the US.  He realized that such a situation would become a huge obstacle 
for US-Soviet cooperation and world peace.  In China at that time, some intellectuals firmly 
asserted that reconstruction assistance for Japan and Germany by the United States was very 
limited and was not intended to significantly restore the power of  the two countries.30  Zhou 
Gengsheng regarded it as an error.  It can be said that his understanding is much closer to the 
actual situation that subsequently followed.
Conclusion
Because he had been almost invariably standing for internationalism, it could be argued 
that there was no significant change in Zhou Gengsheng’s thought after the two world wars. 
However, the establishment of  the People’s Republic of  China largely transformed his argu-
ment.  His representative work in the People’s Republic of  China, International Law, is an 
illustration of  this change.
In Chapter 11 of  this book, Zhou Gengsheng discussed international organizations, typ-
ified by the League of  Nations and the United Nations.  By and large, he found international 
organizations to be a negative construction: “Those organizations are an important form 
of  international cooperation, yet also a place giving rise to sharp international conflicts. 
In particular, imperialists and reactionaries in each country are abusing their positions to 
steer international organizations, interfering in the internal affairs of  other countries, and 
violating their sovereignty.  As a result, international organizations inevitably cause various 
conflicts within themselves and lead to strong opposition from outside.”31  The League of  
 29 Zhou Gengsheng, “Guoji zhengzhi yu yuanzineng,” p. 3.




Nations, he complained, could not suppress the Manchurian Incident and the annexation 
of  Czechoslovakia by Germany, and was also continuously hostile to the Soviet Union.  It 
is difficult to find any evaluation based on internationalism.  The United Nations was given 
a similar negative assessment.  He denounced the principle of  non-interference in internal 
affairs stipulated in the UN Charter as being trampled by imperialists and “reactionaries in 
each country.”  He expressed strong dissatisfaction with “the international law theory of  the 
Western capitalist class “due to their “defending” of  such illegal situations.32
It can be said that Zhou Gengsheng liquidated internationalism at this phase.  Several 
factors are associated with his decision to do so.  First, the breadth of  speech that was allowed 
to intellectuals such as Zhou Gengsheng in the People’s Republic was very narrow.  As a 
result, the possibility of  advocating collective security that also encompassed the Western 
countries was exceedingly low.  Second, in the People’s Republic, intellectuals themselves vol-
untarily abandoned their past discourse which was mostly derived from the Western World, 
and assisted in spreading the discourse to uphold the Chinese Communist Party.  In particu-
lar, Zhou Gengsheng believed that the US forces in the Korean War used biological weapons 
and severely denounced this use as “a barbaric act threatening all civilized human beings.” 
He most likely held fierce resentment against the US.33
One cannot reject the view that great powers continue to intervene in other countries 
under the guise of  the United Nations.  As Zhou Gengsheng himself  pointed out, this char-
acteristic also applied to the League of  Nations.  In the past, Zhou Gengsheng persistently 
supported the idea of  international organizations, despite their various negative features. 
However, the hope that international law would provide new possibilities was also disre-
garded as “the international law theory of  Western capitalist class”, with the new interna-
tional law based on “progressive socialism” subsequently replacing it.34  For Zhou Gengsheng, 
new international law that liquidated internationalism would become much more advanced. 
This is as the negative side of  traditional international law which primarily offered assis-
tance to imperialism and the Western capitalist class could be overcome through new leg-
islation.  The international law that he re-imagined by Zhou Gengsheng contained what he 
believed to be various advancements.
Certainly, the peace and international cooperation pursued by Zhou Gengsheng were 
highly affected by theories on international politics, and also by the laws of  the US and the 
UK.  Under the theories, great powers including the US and the UK were often allowed to 
 31 Zhou Gengsheng, Guojifa, vol. 2, p. 687.
 32 Ibid., p. 700.
 33 Zhou Gengsheng, “Meiguo qinlüezhe jinxing xijunzhan bing qinfan woguo lingkong de falü zeren,” 
pp. 5–7.
 34 Zhou Gengsheng, Guojifa, vol. 2, p. 55.
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promote their own interests on one hand, while on the other hand the existence of  weak coun-
tries might not be taken into account.  The new international law would aim to completely 
overcome such failures.  However, as shown by the severe conflict between the Soviet Union 
and the People’s Republic, new international law could not necessarily overcome all of  these 
failures.  Therefore, the decision to firmly support the Anglo-American international law was 
fully understandable.  Despite recognizing its failures, he would take a chance on interna-
tional cooperation exhorted by the Anglo-American international law after the World Wars. 
Nevertheless, completely rejecting it under the regime of  the People’s Republic seemingly sac-
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